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The More Things Change 
the major causes, it seems, were protracted peace and 
material prosperity. 
Peace we thought was at hand when, to everyone's 
relief, the cold war came to an apparent end and (or so 
it was thought) we entered a "new world order." And 
prosperity? Well, once the need to ann ourselves to the 
teeth evaporated, the money left over, the much 
ballyhooed "peace dividend," could be used to educate 
the young, house the poor, tend the elderly, and generally 
to share an abundant material prosperity to more and 
more people. 
Times change. Even as I write this, the United States 
and Iraq remain at war, and the "peace dividend" has 
found its way into anning and supporting upwards of 
500,000combat-ready soldiers. So much for the "peace 
dividend." And so much for helping others prosper 
materially. The plain fact is, the poor are getting poorer, 
those who need housing most are getting less, the elderly 
are being warehoused in institutions of despair, and so 
on. If, then, Ryder is right in believing that peace and 
prosperity are needed if animal protection efforts are to 
meet with success, the present looks more like the worst 
than the best of times for the animals. 
This should hardly be surprising. Making the world 
better for nonhuman animals is not something that can 
be achieved independently of making the world better 
for human beings. The slogan, "Animal liberation is 
human liberation," is more than a slogan. Genuine 
advances in the justice and quality oflife made available 
to the one are inseparable from similar advances made 
for the other. Things do change in the sense that the 
identities of the victims of injustice, whether human or 
otherwise, differover time; but so longas injustice rules, 
whether the victims are humans or other animals, things 
stay the same. 
This is why animal advocates who restrict their time 
and energy to animal liberation might pause to ask, not 
whether our brothers and sisters in fur and feathers and 
ems deserve justice (for they do) but whether they have 
any realistic chance of obtaining it if we are blind to 
the injustice suffered by our brothers and sisters in 
human form. This is not to say that we should abandon 
the other animals and give all our time and energy to 
righting human injustices. This is not to say that at all. 
It is only to say that we need to consider the promise 
and power of a more complete activism. If there is one 
point in Ryder's book about animal advocates of the 
past that is of particular relevance to animal advocates 
of the present, this is it. 
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I am flattered by Tom Regan's very kind and 
interesting review of my book Animal Revolution: 
Changing Attitudes Towards Speciesism, not leastbecause 
of his own unparalleled contribution to the cause. I hope 
my work is more than just a history of the animal 
movement; I have tried to introduce some new psycho-
logical, philosophical, and political ideas on the way. 
Regan draws attention to my view that Darwinism 
did not contribute much to the nineteenth century animal 
campaigns. One reason for this was that animal welfare 
had already become, by the 1860's, a part of the British 
orthodox establishment. Darwin was, in effect, fIrmly 
kidnapped by scientific provivisectors like Huxley who 
challenged that orthodoxy. In consequence animal 
welfarists saw Darwin as their enemy rather than friend. 
It was this paradox that struck me as an undergraduate 
at Cambridge in the early 1960's. Why was it that the 
scientists who happily experimented on animals were 
the same people who based their philosophies upon 
Darwinian evolution? Experimentation seemed to me to 
have become the blood ritual of an alternative and 
cannibalistic religion; it preached kinship and yet urged 
the ruthless exploitation of kin. This apparent 
inconsistency rankled inside me until my indignation 
erupted in newspaper letters written in Oxford in 1969 in 
which I spelt out what I considered to be the moral 
implications ofDarwin's message. Ironically, after some 
years of campaigning on this Darwinian basis, I now 
consider that morality is betterbased upon sentiency than 
upon evolutionary kinship. Hence my promotion ofwhat 
I call sentientism-the moral primacy of the individual's 
capacity to feel IXlin or distress regardless as to whether 
these states are experienced by a human, a rat, an alien, 
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or a machine. I consider that sentient machines should 
be included within the moral circle (if ever they are 
invented) despite their lack of kinship with us. 
I think Tom Regan has slightly simplified my position 
on the question of "rights." It is tme that I was wary of 
using the word because I felt it was "synthetic." But I 
meantby this only that"rights"was an artificialor human-
made construct Yet, despite this, people seemed to be 
using the word (in the context of the human rights 
campaigns of the 1960's) as if rights had an objective 
existence, defined by law or in some other concrete way. 
This is one reason why, in my earlier writings, I invented 
the word"speciesism" (as a parnllel to sexism andracism) 
and referred to interests instead of rights. I do, however, 
as Regan points out, honour the spiritoftherightsposition 
because I reject the utilitarians' aggregating ofpains and 
pleasures across individuals. There is a mysterious but 
deeply important boundary between individuals through 
which consciousness (sentiency) itself cannot penetrate. 
I may sympathise or empathise with your pain but I can 
never feel that same pain as you feel it IfI stand outside 
the system then I can, in a sense, aggregate the pains and 
pleasures ofothers but, unless the aggregatorcan actually 
feel all those pains and pleasures, then the aggregation 
has little meaning. In a fascinating way, consciousness is 
anchored in the individual and is nontransferable. 
Although I find it hard to prove why, I consider that such 
nontransferability must invalidate aggregation. Trade-
offs of pains and pleasures are alright within a sentient 
individual but are out of order between individuals. This 
is why I prefer the rights position to the utilitarian position 
(which allows, for example, the torturing to death ofa child 
if the sum total of the pleasures of its sadistic torturers 
is greater than the child's agony). However, what I like 
about the utilitarians is that they focus on pain and pleasure 
(happiness) as the basis for morality and notother, vaguer, 
criteria As a psychologist I have found that the answer to 
thequestions "what isgood about liberty orjusticeorequal-
ity etc.?" is always, ultimately, the same---''becauseI think 
these things Gustice, equality, etc.) will make me happy." 
In other words, I believe criteria such as liberty or 
justice, or Regan's "inherent value," are secondary to the 
primary criterion ofpain/pleasure (happiness). 
I may say that I recognize the presumptuousness of 
my posture in trying to bring together the pain/pleasure 
emphasis of Singer with the rights position of Regan. It 
is impertinent of me to attempt to straddle this divide. I 
will, no doubt, receive my just deserts if I fall into the 
abyss to be duly ground to dust between the two 
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philosophical colossi! Anyway, I have tossed this idea 
of sentientism into the debate. 
As Regan rightly points out, from a practical point of 
view we will be better advised to speak many tongues. I 
have found this particularly tme as a political campaigner 
and publicist for animal welfare/rights/liberation. Older 
and more conservative people in Britain, for example, 
respond better to talk of animal welfare and appeals to 
their sense of duty or responsibility. Younger and more 
radical people prefer to talk of rights. I have suggested 
in Animal Revolution that one reason for this is that those 
who feel they have no power identify with victims 
whereas those who feel powerful do so less. 
In the interface between environmentalists (who 
sometimes glibly talk ofthe rights oftrees and mountains 
as if they were sentient and without really analyzing the 
usually anthropocentric basis of their ethic) and animal 
rightists, language flexibility is particularly useful. In 
practical terms environmentalism usually coincides with 
animal welfare in its aims and, even if many key 
environmentalists argue from an anthropocentric point 
of view, some others arereally animal rightists in disguise. 
It is this latter group which becomes indignant when it 
discovers, for example, that their environmental associ-
ation is advocating killing animals in order to preserve 
plant species. Environmentalism and sentientism can 
be reconciled by arguing that trees and rocks must be 
preserved because their destruction means pain for many 
sentients-those who depend upon these trees and rocks 
as habitats as well as for those humans who suffer 
aesthetically by their loss or disfigurement. 
Finally, Regan is right to emphasis the link between 
human and nonhuman welfare. Not only are they philo-
sophically one, but each tends to encourage the other. If 
my theory is right, it is only when humans enjoy peace 
and prosperity that there are widespread advances in the 
treatment ofnonhumans. The current recession in Britain 
has coincided with apparent increases in certain forms of 
animal cruelty and a decrease, albeit slight, in the public 
enthusiasm for green issues generally. One must add, 
and this is an optimistic note, that this decline in interest 
also coincides with three huge human disasters-the 
plightofthe Kurds, theEthiopians, and the Bangladeshis 
which have recently preoccupied the British media and 
public. But during the GulfWar itselfmembers ofParlia-
ment still continued to receive more letters about animal 
welfare than any other topic-including the war. We frrst 
put animals into politics in Britain for the 1979 election, 
and we are currently aiming to do it again for the next one. 
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